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I.

INTRODUCTION

In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
the biggest question is often whether the individual is subject to a
sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”).1 The charge typically carries a maximum penalty of ten
years’ imprisonment.2 However, the ACCA increases the statutory
range from zero to ten years to fifteen years to life if the individual
has three or more prior convictions that qualify as “violent
felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s].”3
Three routes exist by which a prior conviction can qualify as a
“violent felony”—the elements clause, the enumerated-offenses
clause, and the residual clause. Before 2015, courts safely housed
most offenses within the residual clause.4 Then, on June 26, 2015,
the Supreme Court issued its monumental decision in Johnson II,
invalidating the residual clause.5 Subsequently, courts across the nation have reevaluated whether offenses that once qualified under the
residual clause continue to qualify as ACCA predicate offenses.6
Usually, the answer depends on whether the offense qualifies under
the elements clause.7 That clause requires courts to determine
whether an offense has as an element “the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force” against another person, or, as the
“The ACCA is one of the most onerous mandatory sentencing provisions
found in the federal criminal code.” Katherine Menendez, Johnson v. United
States: Don’t Go Away, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2016, at 12, 13.
2
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a) (2012).
3
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
4
See infra Section IV.B.
5
Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
6
See, e.g., United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc);
United States v. Jones, 877 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 801–02 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260,
1262 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751, 753–55 (7th Cir.
2016); United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 683 (6th Cir. 2015).
7
See supra note 6.
1
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Supreme Court put it in Johnson I, whether the offense requires “violent force.”8
Since Johnson II, the tension within the Eleventh Circuit has
been palpable. There has been substantial and fervent disagreement
about the meaning of Johnson I and the reach of Johnson II, and
rightfully so. These decisions are important. They affect whether
scores of people are condemned to serve years—if not decades—of
additional prison time.9 Given the importance of these issues, this
Article examines that tension, including three ways the court got it
wrong—specifically, the court’s unusual conduct in ruling on requests to file second or successive post-conviction motions based on
Johnson II, and recent rulings on whether the Florida offenses of
robbery and felony battery qualify as ACCA predicate offenses. 10
II.

THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT & BACKGROUND
PRINCIPLES

The ACCA is a recidivist sentencing enhancement that applies
to defendants convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted
felon.11 Normally, this conviction carries a statutory maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment for such convictions.12 But if a defendant has three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony” or
a “serious drug offense,” the ACCA requires a mandatory minimum
sentence of fifteen years.13 The ACCA defines a “violent felony” as
a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that: (1)
“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (“the elements clause”); (2)
“is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives” (“the
enumerated-offenses clause”); or (3) “otherwise involves conduct
8

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i); Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S.
133, 140 (2010).
9
See United States v. Gundy, 842 F.3d 1156, 1179 (11th Cir. 2016) (Jill
Pryor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (“In recent years, around 700 defendants each year have been convicted in [the Eleventh] Circuit of being a felon
in possession of a firearm . . . . These numbers . . . mean that thousands of defendants stand to have their sentences increased by at least five years . . . .”).
10
See infra Parts IV & V.
11
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012).
12
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
13
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
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that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”
(“the residual clause”).14
Determining whether an offense satisfies one of the ACCA
clauses implicates several highly technical legal principles, and
those principles may apply differently depending on the clause at
issue. For example, in analyzing whether a prior conviction qualifies
as a “violent felony,” courts must use a categorical approach, examining only the statutory elements of an offense, rather than the facts
underlying a conviction.15 However, the categorical approach is applied differently depending on the clause involved. Under the elements clause and enumerated-offenses clause, courts must assume
an offense was committed by the least of the acts criminalized under
the state statute.16 The residual clause, on the other hand, requires

14

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). The only instance in
which a court may look at the records relating to a defendant’s prior conviction is
if the defendant’s statute of conviction is “divisible,” meaning the statute sets forth
alternative elements that a jury must choose between, and one of the alternatives
would not qualify as a “violent felony.” See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S.
254, 257–58 (2013). This is called the modified categorical approach, and under
this approach, courts may examine a limited universe of judicially-approved materials called Shepard documents, including the indictment, jury instructions, and
plea agreement, to determine the element under which the defendant was convicted. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). The Supreme Court
has cautioned, however, that the modified categorical approach “merely helps implement the categorical approach when a defendant was convicted of violating a
divisible statute.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263. If a statute does not set forth alternative elements, but a single “indivisible” element, the modified categorical approach does not apply. Id. at 258–59. Often, the line between a divisible, disjunctively phrased set of elements and an indivisible, disjunctively phrased set of factual means of accomplishing a single element can be murky. See Mathis v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). But the Supreme Court has clarified that
elements are the “things [that] must be charged” in a statute for conviction, while
means “need not be.” Id. at 2256. If a statute comprises indivisible means, courts
must apply the categorical approach, without using Shepard documents to identify
which means was committed. Id. at 2255.
16
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013) (citing Johnson I, 559
U.S. 133, 137 (2010)) (describing the least-culpable-act rule); see United States
v. Braun, 801 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Johnson I, 559 U.S. at
138).
15
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courts to determine the conduct and degree of risk involved in the
“ordinary case” of an offense.17
In Johnson II, the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause,
forcing courts across the nation to reconsider whether convictions
which had qualified under the residual clause still qualified under
the elements or enumerated-offenses clauses.18 Most of these evaluations revolved around the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
elements clause in Johnson I.19
A.
The Residual Clause & Johnson II
In Johnson II, the Supreme Court struck down the ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.20 According to the Johnson II Court,
“[t]wo features of the [ACCA’s] residual clause conspire[d] to make
it unconstitutionally vague.”21 First, it required judges to determine
what kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of a crime involves.22
Judges then had to determine whether their judicially-imagined “ordinary case” posed enough of a risk to qualify as a “violent felony.”23 As the Supreme Court clarified in Welch v. United States:
The vagueness of the residual clause rests in large
part on its operation under the categorical approach . . . . For purposes of the residual clause, then,
courts were to determine whether a crime involved a

17
See Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 607–10 (3d Cir. 2016) (contrasting the least-culpable-act inquiry with the ordinary-case inquiry).
18
Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
19
See Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140.
20
Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The void-for-vagueness doctrine bars the
Government from “taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it
punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Id. at 2556 (internal citations omitted).
21
Id. at 2557; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018).
22
Id. (stating that the ACCA’s residual clause left “grave uncertainty about
how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” since “[i]t ties the judicial assessment
of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime”).
23
Id. at 2558 (“It is one thing to apply an imprecise ‘serious potential risk’
standard to real-world facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge-imagined
abstraction.”).
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“serious potential risk of physical injury” by considering not the defendant’s actual conduct but an “idealized ordinary case of the crime.”
The Court’s analysis in Johnson [I] thus cast no
doubt on the many laws that “require gauging the
riskiness of conduct in which an individual defendant
engages on a particular occasion.” The residual
clause failed not because it adopted a “serious potential risk” standard but because applying that standard
under the categorical approach required courts to assess the hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version of the offense. In the Johnson [I]
Court’s view, the “indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry” made the residual clause more unpredictable and arbitrary in its application than the Constitution allows. “Invoking so shapeless a provision . . . does not comport with the Constitution’s
guarantee of due process.”24
Thus, the Supreme Court held that increasing a defendant’s sentence under the residual clause is a denial of due process.25
B.
The Elements Clause & Johnson I
Without the residual clause, the validity of thousands of ACCA
enhancements now depends on whether predicate convictions qualify under the elements clause—in other words, whether certain offenses have as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force” against another person.26 Five years before Johnson II, the Supreme Court clarified the limits of what constitutes
“physical force” under the elements clause in Johnson I.27
Johnson I stemmed from the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that a
Florida conviction for simple battery committed by touching another
person against his will was a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s
24

Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2016) (internal citations
omitted).
25
Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. at 2563.
26
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
27
Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).
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elements clause.28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the “physical force” requirement for the first time.29 The Johnson I
Court held that in the context of the statutory definition of a “violent
felony,” “physical force” means “violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”30 The
Court observed that “[e]ven by itself, the word ‘violent’ . . . connotes
a substantial degree of force.”31 Notably, in defining “physical
force,” the Court relied on Flores v. Ashcroft, a Seventh Circuit decision holding that “physical force” means force “intended to cause
bodily injury, or at a minimum likely to do so.”32 And because a
Florida simple battery committed by a mere “touch” does not categorically require violent force, the Supreme Court held it does not
satisfy the elements clause.33
III.

WELCH AND THE SUMMER OF SOS ORDERS

After Johnson II, a question of considerable importance was
whether prisoners whose sentences were based on the ACCA’s residual clause would be able to benefit from Johnson II under 28

28

United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008). The Florida battery statute provides that a simple battery occurs when a person “1.
[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of
the other; or 2. [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person.”
§ 784.03(1)(a), FLA. STAT. (2017). Because the Shepard documents in Johnson I
did not allow the district court to conclude the battery conviction rested on anything more that the least culpable act, the conviction was presumed to have rested
on an intentional, unwanted touching. Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 137. Typically, a
conviction for simple battery is a misdemeanor, but it becomes a felony if the
defendant has a previous battery conviction. § 784.03(1)(b)–(2), FLA. STAT.
29
See Daija M. Page, Forcing the Issue: An Examination of Johnson v.
United States, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1191, 1197 (2011).
30
Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140 (citing Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672
(7th Cir. 2003)) (“We think it clear that in the context of a statutory definition of
‘violent felony,’ the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”).
31
Id. (“When the adjective ‘violent’ is attached to the noun ‘felony,’ its connotation of strong physical force is even clearer.”).
32
Flores, 350 F.3d at 672.
33
Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 139 (noting that the plain meaning of “force” suggests “a degree of power that would not be satisfied by the merest touching”).
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U.S.C. § 2255, the primary vehicle by which prisoners seek to vacate, set aside, or correct their judgments.34 The answer would affect
inmates across the nation. And to be sure, the issue was time-sensitive. Under § 2255(f)(3), prisoners have only one year from the date
the Supreme Court recognizes a new right to file a § 2255 motion,
if the right applies retroactively on collateral review.35 The rules are
even stricter for inmates who have previously filed a § 2255 motion.36
Once an inmate files one § 2255 motion, he cannot file a “second
or successive” § 2255 motion unless the new right: (1) is “a new rule
of constitutional law”; (2) “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme
Court”; and (3) the court of appeals grants the inmate permission to
file such a motion.37 Most inmates seeking post-conviction relief

34

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012) (“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a
court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”).
35
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from . . . the date on which
the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review . . . .”). Inmates have one year to file a post-conviction
motion, and that one-year clock begins to run based on the occurrence of one of
four triggering events. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The most common triggering event is
the date the prisoner’s “judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f)(1). However, another one is when the Supreme Court recognizes a new
right, and that new right applies retroactively on collateral review. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f)(3). When that happens, prisoners have a year from the date of the Supreme Court’s decision to file a § 2255 motion. Id.
36
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255(h) (2012).
37
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (“A second or successive motion must be certified
as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive . . . by the Supreme
Court, that was previously unavailable.”) (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2)(A) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application . . . shall be dismissed unless . . . the applicant shows that the claim relies
on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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based on Johnson II had to file “second or successive” § 2255 motions.38 The problem was that the Eleventh Circuit held Johnson II
was only retroactively applicable in a first § 2255 motion, but not in
a second or successive § 2255 motion.39 Therefore, a little more than
six months after Johnson II, the Supreme Court stepped in once
again.40 Recognizing that time was of the essence, the Court issued
its decision in Welch v. United States about three months after granting certiorari (and, remarkably, only nineteen days after oral argument).41
A.
Welch v. United States
The question presented in Welch was whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in denying Mr. Welch a certificate of appealability
38

See In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x 765, 771–72 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J.,
concurring) (“Most ACCA prisoners already filed a § 2255 motion years ago, so
the only way for them to get relief based on the Johnson [II] decision is to come
to a court of appeals and ask for permission to file another § 2255 motion in district court.”).
39
Compare Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728, 737 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e
hold that Johnson applies retroactively on collateral review to prisoners seeking
habeas relief for the first time.”), with In re Franks, 815 F.3d 1281, 1283–86 (11th
Cir. 2016), abrogated by In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding
that Johnson II is not retroactive for purposes of second or successive § 2255
motions because the Supreme Court had not “made” Johnson [II] retroactive), and
In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 989 (11th Cir. 2015), abrogated by In re Thomas, 823
F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Although we agree that Johnson [II] announced a
new substantive rule of constitutional law, we reject the notion that the Supreme
Court has held that the new rule should be applied retroactively on collateral review.”). See also In re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J.,
concurring) (“We were in the minority of courts that, from the beginning, said
prisoners could not benefit from Johnson [II] if they had already filed an earlier
§ 2255 motion.”); In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x at 777 (Martin, J., concurring)
(quoting In re Franks, 815 F.3d at 1289 (Martin, J., dissenting)) (“For months,
[Franks] ‘denied the application of Johnson [II] to potentially hundreds of people
based on pro se pleadings and without oral argument or briefing.’”).
40
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 790, 790 (2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari on January 8, 2016).
41
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016) (reversing the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on April 18, 2016); In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x at
773 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Nineteen days later, the Welch decision abrogated
our court’s precedent . . . .”). During those three months, the Eleventh Circuit was
the only circuit that refused to stay applications for leave to file second or successive § 2255 motions. See id. at 777.
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(“COA”)42 on, among other things, whether his sentence was unconstitutional in light of Johnson II.43 To decide that narrow issue, however, the Court had to resolve a broader legal question—whether
Johnson II applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.44 The
answer would affect thousands of inmates in the Eleventh Circuit.45
To resolve that question, the Court applied the framework set forth
42

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), the denial of a § 2255 motion cannot be appealed unless a circuit judge
or district court judge issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2012). To obtain a
COA, a movant must make a “substantial showing” that his constitutional right
has been denied. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). That standard is satisfied if a movant
can show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the [motion] should have been resolved in a different manner.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 475 (2000). “[A] claim can be debatable even though
every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case
has received full consideration, that [the movant] will not prevail.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003).
43
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264. A brief background about Mr. Welch’s case: In
2010, Gregory Welch was sentenced to the ACCA’s mandatory minimum term of
15 years’ imprisonment based, in part, on a 1996 Florida conviction for robbery.
Id. at 1262. At sentencing, he objected that the conviction did not qualify as a
“violent felony” under the ACCA. Id. The district court, however, overruled that
objection, and on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.
Id. at 1263. The district court ruled Welch’s robbery conviction qualified under
both the elements clause and the residual clause, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
based solely on the residual clause. Id. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id.
(citing Welch v. United States, 568 U.S. 1112 (2013) (mem.) (denying certiorari
on January 7, 2013). In December 2013, Mr. Welch moved pro se for the vacatur
of his sentence under § 2255, arguing that his Florida robbery conviction itself
was vague, and his attorney was ineffective by allowing him to be sentenced under
the ACCA. Id. The district court denied the motion and a COA. Id. Mr. Welch
appealed and moved for a COA in the Eleventh Circuit. Id. In his motion, he noted
Johnson II was pending in the Supreme Court and argued his ACCA sentence was
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. Id. In June 2015, less than three
weeks before Johnson II, the Eleventh Circuit denied Mr. Welch’s motion for a
COA. Id. After Johnson II, Mr. Welch sought an extension of time to petition for
reconsideration, but the motion was returned to him unfiled because the time to
seek reconsideration had already expired. Id. The Supreme Court then granted Mr.
Welch’s pro se petition for a writ of certiorari. Id.
44
Id. at 1261 (“The present case asks whether Johnson is a substantive decision that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.”). Notably, because the
United States agreed with Mr. Welch that Johnson II applies retroactively, the
Supreme Court appointed independent counsel as amicus curiae to argue against
retroactivity. Id. at 1263.
45
See infra Part III.B.
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by Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane.46 Under
Teague, the general rule is that “new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure” are not retroactively applicable on collateral review.47
However, two categories of rules are not subject to this general
bar—new substantive rules and new watershed rules of criminal
procedure.48 The parties in Welch agreed that Johnson II announced
a new rule of constitutional law.49 The parties also agreed that the
new rule announced in Johnson II was not a new watershed rule of
criminal procedure.50 The question, then, was whether the new rule
announced in Johnson II was a “substantive rule” or a “procedural
rule.”51 The Welch Court held that Johnson II announced a substantive rule because it changed the reach of the ACCA, not the judicial
46

Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (discussing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301
(1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)). Teague was decided in the context of a
federal collateral challenge to a state conviction, while Welch involved a challenge to a federal conviction. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly
held the Teague framework applies under such circumstances, for purposes of this
case, the parties and the Court assumed it did. Id.
47
Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 310).
48
Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) and Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
49
Id. (“It is undisputed that Johnson announced a new rule.”). “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on
the . . . Government.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. “To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. A holding is only dictated by precedent if it would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528–29 (1997). However, a case does not announce a new
rule “when it is merely an application of the principle that governed a prior decision to a different set of facts.” Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347–48
(2013) (internal quotes and alterations omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307).
50
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (“The parties agree that Johnson does not fall
into the limited second category for watershed procedural rules.”). A new watershed rule of criminal procedural implicates “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings.” Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495. “Although the precise
contours of this exception may be difficult to discern,” the Supreme Court has
generally cited Gideon v. Wainwright, which held “that a defendant has the right
to be represented by counsel in all criminal trials for serious offenses, to illustrate
the type of rule coming within the exception.” Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)).
51
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264–65. A rule is substantive if it “alters the range of
conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes,” including rules “that narrow
the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms,” and “constitutional de-
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procedures by which the statute is applied, and therefore, Johnson
II applied retroactively.52 The Court, however, declined to wade into
the merits of Mr. Welch’s motion, remanding the case to the Eleventh Circuit to decide whether Mr. Welch’s Florida conviction for
robbery still qualified as an ACCA predicate offense under the elements clause.53
B.
The Summer of SOS Orders
After Welch was issued on April 18, 2016, inmates had slightly
more than two months—until the one-year anniversary of Johnson
II—to submit applications to the Eleventh Circuit for leave to file
second or successive § 2255 motions, obtain approval, and file the
motions in the district court.54 Thousands did.55

terminations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the [government’s] power to punish.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–53. On the
other hand, procedural rules regulate “the manner of determining the defendant’s
culpability.” Id. at 353. For example, rules that alter “the range of permissible
methods for determining whether a defendant’s conduct is punishable.” Id.
52
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. The Court noted that not every decision altering
the scope of a statute is a substantive decision. Id. at 1268. For example, a decision
altering the scope of a procedural statute, such as one regulating the admission of
evidence at trial, would itself be a procedural decision, and not retroactive on collateral review. Id.
53
Id. (“It may well be that the Court of Appeals on remand will determine on
other grounds that the District Court was correct to deny Welch’s motion to amend
his sentence. For instance, the parties continue to dispute whether Welch’s strongarm robbery conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause of
the Act, which would make Welch eligible for a 15-year sentence regardless of
Johnson.”).
54
“[A]n inmate has one year to petition for relief, from the date the Supreme
Court initially recognized a right, not from the date the Supreme Court held the
right to be retroactively applicable.” In re Jones, 830 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir.
2016) (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring) (citing Dodd v. United States,
545 U.S. 353 (2005)). Notably, “Welch is the Supreme Court’s first ever § 2255
case to make a new rule of constitutional law retroactive less than a year after the
rule was announced.” In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016).
55
See In re Jones, 830 F.3d at 1301 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring)
(“[A]long with our regular workload, in the three months alone since Welch issued, we have also received more than 1,800 Johnson-based requests for authorization.”); In re Clayton, 829 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin & Pryor,
JJ., concurring) (“In the last couple of months, this court has received hundreds of
these applications from prisoners who want relief based on the Supreme Court’s
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The circumstances under which the Eleventh Circuit rules on
these applications are unusual. When ruling on such applications,
the court must determine whether the applicant makes a “prima facie
showing” that his claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law
made retroactive by the Supreme Court.56 The applications are typically filed pro se, on a form provided by the Eleventh Circuit, with
no briefing.57 The court must rule on them within 30 days.58 If a
claim is rejected, an applicant cannot bring the claim again, even if
there is a later change in the law that shows he should have been
granted authorization.59 What’s more, the Eleventh Circuit’s rulings
on these applications cannot be reconsidered by the court or reviewed by the Supreme Court.60
ruling in Johnson.”); In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x 765, 771 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring) (“Judges on this nation’s courts of appeals have now witnessed
a flood of applications coming from inmates who believe that Johnson may mean
their sentence is no longer valid.”).
56
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C), (d)(1)(C) (2012). A prisoner may also seek authorization when his claim relies on “newly discovered evidence that . . . would
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)
(2012).
57
See United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2016)
(Martin, J., concurring) (“These applications are almost always filed by prisoners
with no lawyers. They include no briefs. In fact, the form used by prisoners for
these applications forbids the prisoner from filing briefs or any attachments, unless the form is filed by a prisoner suffering under a death sentence.”).
58
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) (“The court of appeals shall grant or deny the
authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after
the filing of the motion.”). It seems that the Eleventh Circuit “is the only court to
force a decision on every one of these cases within 30 days of filing.” In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x at 777 (Martin, J., concurring). Other courts have held that the
thirty-day limitations period is advisory rather than mandatory. Orona v. United
States, 826 F.3d 1196, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); In re Siggers, 132
F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1997).
59
In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (stating
that § 2244(b)(1) provides that a repetitious filing “shall be dismissed,” and noting
that the word “shall” does not convey discretion); see In re Parrish, No. 17-11523,
slip op. at 4 (11th Cir. May 5, 2017) (Martin, J., concurring) (“So we now know
that, as he has told us all along, Mr. Parrish’s ACCA sentence is not lawful . . . .
But again, because this panel made a mistake in denying Mr. Parrish’s first application, Baptiste prevents us from even considering his application today.”).
60
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (“The grant or denial of an authorization by a
court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable
and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”).
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In the four months after Welch, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on
hundreds of Johnson II-based applications (“SOS orders”).61 Of the
hundreds, 33 were published.62 That means the court, racing to issue
orders in a short 30-day window, created unreviewable precedent
based on forms filled out by pro se prisoners. Many, if not most, of
those decisions were splintered.63 And in ruling on these applications, the Eleventh Circuit went beyond merely determining whether
“This means no motion for reconsideration, no motion for en banc review, no
appeal, and no petition for cert. The decisions [the Eleventh Circuit] make[s] in
these cases are therefore, as a practical matter, not reviewable.” In re Leonard,
655 F. App’x at 778 (Martin, J., concurring).
61
See in re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring) (“[I]n the two months since Welch, . . . our court has denied hundreds of
applications to file § 2255 motions based on Johnson [II] . . . .”) (citations omitted).
62
See In re Welch, 884 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2018); In re Hernandez, 857
F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2017); In re Parker, 832 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2016); In re
Chance, 831 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Moore, 830 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir.
2016); In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Jones, 830 F.3d 1295
(11th Cir. 2016); In re Sams, 830 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Gomez, 830
F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Anderson, 829 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2016); In
re Davis, 829 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Burgest, 829 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.
2016); In re Watt, 829 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Clayton, 829 F.3d 1254
(11th Cir. 2016); In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Hunt; 835
F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016); In re
Gordon, 827 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Parker, 827 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.
2016); In re Sapp, 827 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Williams, 826 F.3d 1351
(11th Cir. 2016); In re Colon, 826 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Jackson, 826
F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2016); In re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2016); In re
Rogers, 825 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Hires, 825 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir.
2016); In re Adams, 825 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Hines, 824 F.3d 1334
(11th Cir. 2016); In re Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Pinder, 824
F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2016); In re
Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Robinson, 822 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir.
2016).
63
See, e.g., In re Parker, 832 F.3d at 1250–51 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ.,
concurring); In re Chance, 831 F.3d at 1342 (Tjoflat, J., concurring); In re Jones,
830 F.3d at 1297–1305 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring); In re Gomez,
830 F.3d at 1228–29 (Carnes, J., concurring); In re Anderson, 829 F.3d at 1294–
97 (Martin, J., dissenting); In re Davis, 829 F.3d at 1300–02 (Carnes, J., dissenting); In re Clayton, 829 F.3d at 1256–67 (Martin & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring); id.
at 1267–76 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring); In re Smith, 829 F.3d at
1281–85 (Jill Pryor, J., dissenting); In re Hunt, 835 F.3d at 1278–89 (Wilson, Jill
Pryor, & Rosenbaum, JJ., concurring); In re Sapp, 827 F.3d at 1336–41 (Jordan,
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an individual made a “prima facie showing.”64 Instead, the court
combed through each prisoner’s record, publishing orders that
delved into the merits of inmates’ Johnson II claims, including
whether certain offenses have as an element the use of “physical

Rosenbaum, & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring); In re Colon, 826 F.3d at 1306–08 (Martin, J., dissenting); In re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1309–12 (Martin, J., concurring); In
re Fleur, 824 F.3d at 1341–44 (Martin, J., concurring); In re Pinder, 824 F.3d at
979–81 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); In re Robinson, 822 F.3d at 1197–1201 (Martin,
J., concurring); see also In re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1311–12 n.6 (Martin, J., concurring) (listing over 20 splintered decisions in unpublished opinions).
64
See In re Moss, 703 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jordan v.
Sec’y., Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351, 1358 (11th Cir. 2007)) (stating that a prima
facie showing “is a limited determination” and that “‘[t]he district court is to decide the [§ 2255(h)] issue[s] fresh, or in the legal vernacular, de novo.’”). The
Moss Court explained that
[s]hould the district court conclude that [an applicant] has established the statutory requirements for filing a second or successive motion, it shall proceed to consider the merits of the
motion, along with any defenses and arguments the respondent
may raise. Any determination that the district court makes about
whether [an applicant] has satisfied the requirements for filing
a second or successive motion, and any determination it makes
on the merits, if it reaches the merits, is subject to review on
appeal from a final judgment or order if an appeal is filed.
Should an appeal be filed from the district court’s determination, nothing in this order shall bind the merits panel in that appeal.
Id.
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force.”65 No other court of appeals did that.66 And, as one judge observed, much of this occurred outside public view.67 The tension regarding the application of the ACCA’s elements clause after Johnson II, however, was not limited to the post-conviction context. With
the residual clause gone, a critical question remained—what offenses continue to qualify as ACCA predicates? The answer turns,
in large part, on what acts qualify as violent “physical force” under
Johnson I.
65

See In re Leonard, 655 F. App’x at 771–72 (Martin, J., concurring) (“[I]n
reviewing those applications we have been doing more than what the statute directs. The judges of this court, myself included, have been combing through
sealed records from the prisoner’s original sentence hearing to speculate about
whether the prisoner would win if we let him file in district court.”); see also In
re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1311 (Martin, J., concurring); In re Jones, 830 F.3d at
1302 (Rosenbaum & Jill Pryor, JJ., concurring) (“We know that some applications
erroneously were denied, although we do not know how many.”). This practice of
deciding merits issues in published SOS orders raised questions within the Eleventh Circuit about whether such orders are binding outside the unique SOS context. Compare In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To be clear,
our prior-panel-precedent rule applies with equal force as to prior panel decisions
published in the context of applications to file second or successive petitions.”), with United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1350 (11th Cir. 2016)
(Martin, J., concurring) (“It is neither wise nor just for this type of limited ruling,
resulting from such a confined process, to bind every judge on this court as we
consider fully counseled and briefed issues in making merits decisions that may
result in people serving decades or lives in prison.”). Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit resolved that issue by holding published SOS orders are binding on
direct appeal. United States v. St. Hubert, 883 F.3d 1319, 1328–29 (11th Cir.
2018).
66
See In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 310 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing In re Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2016)) (“[W]e do not follow the Eleventh
Circuit, which—contrary to our precedent—resolved a merits question in the context of a motion to authorize a second or successive habeas petition.”); In re
McCall, 826 F.3d at 1312 (Martin, J., concurring) (“[T]his effort sets our court
apart . . . . other courts are not scrutinizing the merits of these cases at this stage.”);
Id. at 1312 n.7 (“I am aware of no order from another court of appeals that combs
through an applicant’s presentence investigation report to decide the merits of his
yet-unfiled motion without ever hearing from a lawyer. And our court has done
this in hundreds of cases.”).
67
See In re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1312 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Our court’s
massive effort to decide the merits of hundreds of habeas cases within 30 days
each, all over a span of just a few weeks, has been largely hidden from public
view. Very few of our orders in these cases are reported or posted on the court’s
website, which means no lawyer is likely to see them.”).
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FLORIDA ROBBERY & THE ELEMENTS CLAUSE

In Johnson I, the Supreme Court observed that the term “physical force” suggests a “substantial degree of force.”68 However, before Johnson II, most offenses fell within the broad sweep of the
residual clause, so courts could avoid engaging in elements clause
analyses.69 But after Johnson II, the elements clause has become the
default home for many offenses under the ACCA.70 So the following
question is more important than ever—what is a “substantial degree
of force”?
In Welch, the Supreme Court left open whether a Florida conviction for robbery qualifies as a “violent felony” under the elements
clause.71 Since then, the issue has not only placed the Eleventh and
Ninth Circuits at odds, but, broadly speaking, created tension among
the circuits about the amount of force required.72
A.
The Florida Robbery Statute
Florida’s robbery statute, Fla. Stat. § 812.13, defines robbery as:
[T]he taking of money or other property which may be
the subject of larceny from the person or custody of
another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or
other property, when in the course of the taking there
is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in
fear.73

Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (“Even by itself, the word ‘violent’ in
§ 924(e)(2)(B) connotes a substantial degree of force.”).
69
See infra Part IV.B.
70
See generally Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Welch v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
71
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268.
72
Compare United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 2016), with
United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 900 (9th Cir. 2017).
73
§ 812.13(1), FLA. STAT. (2017) (emphasis added). The Florida robbery
statute, which was enacted in 1868, has always had a “force” element. The most
recent amendment to the statute was in 1992, when the legislature “add[ed] this
language: ‘with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or
the owner of the money or other property.’” United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d
1326, 1339 n.6 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).
68
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The various degrees of robbery, unchanged since 1974, depend on
whether the perpetrator “carried” a firearm, deadly weapon,
weapon, or no weapon.74 A firearm or weapon that is “carried” by
the perpetrator, though, need not have been “used” in the robbery.
In fact, the victim need not even be aware of the firearm or
weapon.75
B.
The Pre-Johnson II Cases—Dowd, Lockley, and Welch
In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit issued United States v. Dowd, the
first case to address whether a Florida conviction for armed robbery
qualified as a “violent felony.”76 In a single sentence, the Court reasoned “without difficulty” that “Dowd’s January 17, 1974, armed
robbery conviction is undeniably a conviction for a violent felony
[under the ACCA’s elements clause].”77 Dowd, however, was issued
before Johnson I, and, for that matter, any of the recent Supreme
Court cases clarifying the application of the categorical approach.78
74

§ 812.13(2)(a)–(c), FLA. STAT.
See State v. Baker, 452 So. 2d 927, 929 (Fla. 1984) (“[T]he statutory element which enhances punishment for armed robbery is not the use of the deadly
weapon, but the mere fact that a deadly weapon was carried by the perpetrator.
The victim may never even be aware that a robber is armed, so long as the perpetrator has the weapon in his possession during the offense.”); State v. Burris, 875
So. 2d 408, 413 (Fla. 2004) (“In Baker, we recognized the distinction between
carrying a deadly weapon and using a deadly weapon”). “The offense of robbery
while armed contains, in addition to its other constituent statutory elements, the
element that the accused carried a firearm or other deadly weapon. The elements
of the crime do not include displaying the weapon or using it in perpetrating the
robbery.” Williams v. State, 560 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also
United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(“Our precedents apply to Florida robbery as well as armed robbery because the
elements are identical, differing only in what ‘the offender carried’ ‘in the course
of committing the robbery.’) (citing § 812.13, FLA. STAT. (2017)).
76
United States v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006).
77
Id.
78
“Dowd did not conduct the required categorical analysis.” Seabrooks, 839
F.3d at 1348 (Martin, J., concurring).
Nowhere did the Dowd opinion: (1) consult state law to identify
the least culpable conduct for which an armed robbery conviction could be sustained; (2) analyze whether that least culpable
conduct was encompassed by the generic federal offense; or (3)
discuss whether the Florida armed robbery statute was divisible.
It only stated the conclusion (again, in one sentence) that a 1974
Florida armed robbery conviction counts as a violent felony.
75
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Considering Dowd was issued before Johnson I, there was a legitimate question about whether Dowd remained binding precedent.79
During the summer of SOS orders, the court relied on Dowd in
at least three published orders to deny authorization to applicants
with prior Florida convictions for armed robbery.80 At the same
time, however, authorization was granted for individuals with Florida convictions for unarmed robbery before 199781 and for attempted armed robbery.82 The issue came to a head in United States
v. Seabrooks and United States v. Fritts,83 but before turning to those
decisions, it is necessary to first discuss the Eleventh Circuit’s other
pre-Johnson II robbery decisions.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed Florida robbery for the first time
after Johnson I in United States v. Lockley.84 In Lockley, the court
considered whether a 2001 Florida conviction for attempted robbery
qualified as a “crime of violence” under USSG § 4B1.2, the federal
sentencing guideline for career offenders.85 Applying the categorical approach, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the least culpable
Id.
79
Compare id. at 1339, 1341 (majority opinion) (“My view is that Dowd and
its progeny control under our prior panel precedent rule,”), with id. at 1346 (Badlock, J., concurring) (“I would . . . leave for another day the question of the continuing viability of Dowd.”), and id. at 1348 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Dowd is
no longer good law.”).
80
In re Hires, 825 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016) (referencing Dowd and
holding that the defendant’s 1995 Florida robbery conviction qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause); In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345,
1349 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Dowd and holding that the defendant’s 1980 and
1986 Florida “convictions for armed robbery qualify as ACCA predicates under
the elements clause”); In re Moore, 830 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the defendant’s two Florida robbery-with-a-firearm convictions and
his armed robbery conviction “qualify as violent felonies under our binding precedent” in Dowd and Thomas).
81
E.g., In re Pace, No. 16-11898, slip op. at 3–5 (11th Cir. May 16, 2016);
In re Jackson, 826 F.3d 1343, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2016). Prior to 1997, Florida
courts were divided on whether sudden snatchings were robberies. Robinson v.
State, 692 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1997).
82
E.g., In re Lampley, No. 16-12465, slip op. at 4–6 (11th Cir. June 15,
2016); In re James, No. 16-12548, slip op. at 4–5 (11th Cir. June 8, 2016).
83
See infra Part IV.C.
84
United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011).
85
Id. at 1240, 1240 n.1 (stating Lockley had a 2001 Florida conviction for
attempted robbery); see United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1359 (11th
Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring) (“Lockley considered whether a 2001 Florida
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act under the robbery statute was taking an individual’s money or
property by placing him in fear of death or great bodily harm.86 The
court found it “inconceivable” that this type of conduct “would not
involve the use or threatened use of physical force.”87 Because the
guidelines’ commentary stated that “the attempt to commit a ‘crime
of violence’ is itself a ‘crime of violence,’” the Eleventh Circuit
found that Mr. Lockley’s conviction for attempted robbery qualified
as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause.88 The court alternatively concluded that Mr. Lockley’s conviction also qualified
under both the residual clause and the guidelines’ commentary,
which enumerated robbery as a “crime of violence.”89 Notably,

attempted robbery conviction under § 812.13(1) counts as a ‘crime of violence’
within the meaning of the identically-worded elements clause of the Sentencing
Guidelines.”). At that time, the definition of a “violent felony” under the ACCA
and a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines were substantially
similar. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2011), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012). Moreover,
the definitions had identical elements clauses and residual clauses. Compare U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2011), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit considered
cases interpreting the language in one definition as authoritative in cases interpreting the language in the other. Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1243 n.5 (“Though
ACCA’s ‘violent felony’ enhancement and the Guidelines’ career offender enhancement differ slightly in their wording, we apply the same analysis to both.”).
86
Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1244–45.
87
Id. at 1245.
88
Id. The ACCA has no such commentary, so whether an attempted robbery
qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA requires the court to determine
whether the least culpable act for committing an attempted robbery has as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” See United
States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 941–42 n.6 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). However, even under that analysis, the Eleventh Circuit concluded attempted
robbery qualifies as a “violent felony” under the elements clause. United States v.
Joyner, 882 F.3d 1369, 1378–79 (11th Cir. 2018).
89
Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1241–46; In re Jackson, 826 F.3d 1343, 1347 n.2 (11th
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he bulk of Lockley’s analysis (at least 13 paragraphs of the opinion) focused on the argument that ‘Lockley’s prior attempted robbery conviction
qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’ because robbery is an enumerated offense’ in
§ 4B1.2’s application note.”). In 2016, robbery was removed from the commentary and added to the enumerated-offenses clause. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL app. C amt. 798 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
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Lockley did not rely on Dowd, arguably suggesting that Dowd was
no longer good law in light of Johnson I.90
A year after Lockley, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a
1996 Florida conviction for robbery qualified as a “violent felony”
under the ACCA in United States v. Welch.91 In Welch, the Eleventh
Circuit held that this conviction qualified as a “violent felony” under
the ACCA’s residual clause.92 The court, however, declined to address whether such a conviction qualified under the elements
clause.93 The year in which Welch’s offense occurred—before or
after 1997—was critical to the court’s analysis94 because Florida
law relating to robbery qualitatively changed in 1997.95
The Welch court explained that in 1976, the Florida Supreme
Court stated, “[a]ny degree of force suffices to convert larceny into
a robbery.”96 Thereafter, “the state courts of appeal were divided on
whether a snatching, as of a purse, or cash from a person’s hand, or
jewelry on the person’s body, amounted to robbery.”97 Then, in
1997, the Florida Supreme Court decided Robinson v. State, holding
that “for the snatching of property from another to amount to robbery, the perpetrator must employ more than the force necessary to
remove the property from the person. Rather, there must be resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the

90

During the summer of SOS orders, however, the Eleventh Circuit relied on
Lockley’s elements clause holding at least once. See In re Robinson, 822 F.3d
1196, 1197 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Lockley and concluding that the defendant’s
1991 Florida conviction for armed robbery has “as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against” another person).
91
United States v. Welch, 683 F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2012). This same
defendant would go on to prevail in the Supreme Court on whether Johnson II is
retroactive to cases on collateral review. See supra Part III.
92
Welch, 683 F.3d at 1312–13.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1311–12.
95
Id. at 1311, 1311 n.31 (discussing Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886
(Fla. 1997)).
96
Id. at 1311; McCloud, 335 So. 2d at 258.
97
Welch, 683 F.3d at 1311.
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offender.”98 After Robinson, Fla. Stat. § 812.131 was enacted to penalize robbery by sudden snatching.99 Thus, before Robinson, “sudden snatchings” were prosecuted as robberies by “force.”100
Accordingly, the Welch court assumed for purposes of its ACCA
analysis that Mr. Welch pled guilty to robbery “at a time when mere
snatching sufficed.”101 The Welch court discussed Lockley, but
stated, “Lockley does not reach the question of whether robbery by
sudden snatching would or would not present ‘a serious risk of physical injury to another’ under the residual clause[.]”102 As for the elements clause, the court wrote:
[U]nder [Johnson I], “physical force” means not
merely what “force” means in physics, but “violent
force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain
or injury to another person.” That Johnson [I] discussion was in the context of the elements clause requirement of “physical force,” not the residual clause
requirement of “serious risk of potential injury to another.” Arguably the elements clause would not apply to mere snatching, but the issue is not cut and
dried. We need not decide whether snatching is sufficiently violent under the elements clause, though,
because it suffices under the residual clause.103
Once Johnson II invalidated the residual clause, the Eleventh
Circuit was confronted with the question left open in Welch: whether
a pre-1997 robbery conviction qualified as a “violent felony” under
the elements clause.104
C.
The Johnson II Aftermath—Seabrooks & Fritts
In United States v. Seabrooks, the court seemingly had the opportunity to address the question left open in Welch: whether a pre1997 Florida armed robbery conviction qualified under the elements
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Robinson, 692 So. 2d at 886.
Welch, 683 F.3d at 1311 n.30 (citing § 812.131, FLA. STAT. (2000)).
Id. at 1311–12.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1312–13.
Id. at 1313.
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clause.105 Ultimately, however, the court was unable to address this
question because Mr. Seabrooks’ conviction was imposed four
months after the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson, and
was therefore governed by Lockley.106 The court, nevertheless, issued deeply divided dicta about the continuing validity of Dowd and
whether there was truly a distinction between pre-1997 and post1997 robberies.107
Judge Hull, on the one hand, believed Dowd remained binding
precedent, which was confirmed by the SOS decisions relying on
Dowd.108 She also believed that anything Welch said about the elements clause was not only dicta “but wrong dicta” because Robinson
was stating “what the statute always meant.”109 Therefore, according
to Judge Hull, there was no distinction between pre-1997 and post1997 robberies.110 In her view, robberies committed through the use
of “force,” no matter when they occurred, had always required
enough force to overcome a victim’s resistance.111 And based on
Lockley and Dowd, that type of robbery qualified as a “violent felony” under the elements clause.112

105

United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1338 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1341 (“Seabrooks’ armed robbery convictions qualify as ACAAviolent felonies under Lockley.”); see also id. at 1346 (Baldock, J., concurring)
(“All members of the panel agree that [Lockley] answers in the affirmative the
question of whether Defendant qualifies as an armed career criminal for federal
sentencing purposes.”); id. (Martin, J., concurring) (“[T]his panel opinion stands
only for the rule that our Circuit precedent in [Lockley] requires Mr. Seabrooks’s
1997 Florida convictions for armed robbery to be counted in support of his 2015
Armed Career Criminal Act (‘ACCA’) sentence.”).
107
Compare id. at 1339, 1341 (“My view is that Dowd and its progeny control
under our prior panel precedent rule.”), with id. at 1346 (Badlock, J., concurring)
(“I would . . . leave for another day the question of the continuing viability of
Dowd.”), and id. at 1348 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Dowd is no longer good law.”).
108
Id. at 1339–40 (“My view is that Dowd and its progeny control under our
prior panel precedent rule . . . .”); see also id. at 1341–43 (stating that neither
Johnson I, Descamps, nor Mathis abrogated Dowd); id. at 1348 n.1 (Martin, J.,
concurring) (“In her discussion of Dowd, Judge Hull writes for herself.”).
109
Id. at 1344–45 (citing Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–
13 (1994)).
110
See id. at 1344.
111
Id. at 1343–45.
112
Id. at 1341 (“Dowd and Lockley control the outcome of this case.”).
106
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Judge Martin, on the other hand, believed Dowd’s holding had
been abrogated “in light of the clarifications given to us by the Supreme Court about what steps we must take when applying the categorical approach.”113 Nowhere in Dowd, Judge Martin stated, did
the court: “(1) consult state law to identify the least culpable conduct
for which an armed robbery conviction could be sustained; (2) analyze whether that least culpable conduct was encompassed by the
generic federal offense; or (3) discuss whether the Florida armed
robbery statute was divisible.”114 In Judge Martin’s view, the Supreme Court’s instructions to undertake these steps undermined
Dowd’s “conclusory mode of analysis ‘to the point of abrogation.’”115
Judge Martin also opined that the court’s recent reliance on
Dowd in published SOS orders was of no moment given the unique
context in which SOS orders are entered.116 She reasoned:
It is neither wise nor just for this type of limited ruling, resulting from such a confined process, to bind
every judge on this court as we consider fully counseled and briefed issues in making merits decisions
that may result in people serving decades or lives in
prison. The fact that some of this court’s limited rulings on these applications referenced Dowd should
have no bearing on our merits decision here. Dowd
has been abrogated and no longer binds us on the
merits.117

113

Id. at 1348 (Martin, J., concurring); see id. (“Dowd did not conduct the
required categorical analysis. The entirety of Dowd’s reasoning occupies one sentence: ‘Dowd’s January 17, 1974, armed robbery conviction is undeniably a conviction for a violent felony [under the ACCA’s elements clause].’ Dowd’s reasoning was not sufficient to support its holding.”) (internal citations omitted).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1349 (citing United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir.
2008)).
116
Id. at 1350; see supra Part III.B. (discussing the unique context in which
SOS orders are issued). However, the Eleventh Circuit has since held such orders
are binding on direct appeal. United States v. St. Hubert, 883 F.3d 1319, 1328–29
(11th Cir. 2018).
117
Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1350 (Martin, J., concurring).
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As for the distinction between pre-1997 and post-1997 robberies, Judge Martin agreed with Judge Hull insofar as Robinson
stated that the interpretation of a statute is generally a statement
about “what the statute has always meant.”118 But to Judge Martin,
the question was not what the statute meant at the time of Mr. Seabrooks’ conviction.119 Instead, she believed the question was “what
conduct could have resulted in Mr. Seabrooks’s 1997 convictions
under the statute, even if Florida courts were misinterpreting the
statute at that time.”120
Before the April 1997 decision in Robinson, the governing decision was the Florida Supreme Court’s June 1976 opinion in
McCloud v. State, which “held that a defendant who ‘exert[ed] physical force to extract [a handbag] from [the victim’s] grasp’ had committed robbery because ‘any degree of force suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.’”121 Thus, in Judge Martin’s view, between
June 1976 and April 1997, the least culpable act under the Florida
robbery statute was a sudden snatching,122 and both the Supreme
Court’s directives and the Eleventh Circuit’s mode of analysis in
Welch required that result.123 Judge Martin went on to conclude that
118

Id. at 1351 n.5.
Id. (“But here our interest is not about divining the true meaning of
§ 812.13.”).
120
Id.; accord id. at 1351 (citing McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816, 820
(2011) (internal quotations omitted)). Courts are still grappling with whether state
decisions issued after the defendant’s state conviction was imposed should be relied on when “determining the content of state law . . . .” United States v. Geozos,
870 F.3d 890, 899 n.8 (9th Cir. 2017).
121
Id. at 1351 (quoting McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258–59 (Fla.
1976)).
122
Id. To explain her view, Judge Martin states the following:
That means that people convicted under § 812.13 after McCloud in 1976 (but before Robinson in 1997) could have
had their convictions sustained under the statute when they
merely used “any degree of force.” The U.S. Supreme Court’s
instruction to us in McNeill does not allow us to ignore this interpretation by the Florida Supreme Court.
Id.; see also United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2017)
(Martin, J., concurring) (“[T]he year of conviction matters because the least culpable conduct sufficient to support a robbery conviction under Fla. Stat. § 812.13
changed in 1997.”).
123
See Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1352 (Martin, J., concurring) (stating that
Welch “binds us whenever we apply the categorical approach to analyze a Florida
119
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a sudden snatching did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the
elements clause.124 At the end of the day though, despite their disagreements, everyone agreed Mr. Seabrooks’ case was governed by
Lockley, so Judge Hull’s and Judge Martin’s dueling dicta was ultimately just that—dicta.125
Three weeks later, without holding oral argument, Judge Hull
made her side of the story binding precedent in United States v.
Fritts. In Fritts, the court held that under Dowd and Lockley, a 1989
Florida conviction for armed robbery qualified as a “violent felony”
under the elements clause.126 As a result, all Florida convictions for
robbery, regardless of when they occurred, qualify as “violent
felon[ies]” under the ACCA’s elements clause.127
robbery conviction from a time before the Florida Supreme court decided Robinson.”).
124
See Stokeling, 684 F. App’x at 874 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Sudden
snatching with ‘any degree of force,’ plainly does not require the use of ‘a substantial degree of force.’ Neither does it necessarily entail ‘violent force—that is,
force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.’”) (internal
citations omitted).
125
See United States v. Birge, 830 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010)) (“As we have explained time and again: ‘[A] decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that
case.’”). Judge Martin stated:
Judge Hull’s remark that the elements of § 812.13 have not
changed since the 1970s is not necessary to our decision to affirm Mr. Seabrooks’s sentence. Mr. Seabrooks was convicted
after the Florida Supreme Court decided Robinson, so his
§ 812.13 conviction required more than sudden snatching. As a
result, we are bound by Lockley and must affirm Mr. Seabrooks’s enhanced sentence under the ACCA. I analyze Mr.
Seabrooks’s case in a different way than does Judge Hull, but I
agree that his conviction and sentence must be affirmed.
Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1352 (Martin, J., concurring).
126
United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 940 n.3 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We
acknowledge that this opinion uses the discussion in . . . Seabrooks. Given that
these sections were a single judge concurrence, we now use that same analysis as
the panel opinion here.”); id. at 943–44 (“In sum, based on our precedent
in Dowd and Lockley, and in light of the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions
in Robinson, McCloud, and Montsdoca, we conclude that Fritts’s Florida armed
robbery conviction under § 812.13 categorically qualifies as a ‘violent felony’
under the ACCA’s elements clause.”).
127
The Eleventh Circuit continues to affirm ACCA sentences predicated on
Florida robberies based on Fritts. See Stokeling, 684 F. App’x at 871; United
States v. Conde, 686 F. App’x 755, 757 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Burke,
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Since Fritts, the Eleventh Circuit has not only declined to rehear
the issue en banc, where it could reconsider the issue unencumbered
by the weight of prior panel precedent,128 but has granted motions
for summary affirmance, disposing of appeals without issuing even
an unpublished opinion.129 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has made it
undeniably clear that it will not reconsider whether Florida robbery
is a “violent felony.” Right or wrong, this has “enormous consequences for many criminal defendants who come before [the]
[c]ourt.”130
D.

Overcoming Resistance Does Not Require Violent
“Physical Force”
One critical point of contention between Judge Hull and Judge
Martin is whether the standard set forth by the Florida Supreme
Court in Robinson—force sufficient to overcome resistance—governs when evaluating the least culpable act for robbery convictions
imposed between June 1976 and April 1997.131 However, in Seabrooks, both agreed that after April 1997, the least culpable act is
placing a victim in fear, which qualifies under the elements
clause.132 The truth is, they are both wrong about post-1997 robberies. Even if force sufficient to overcome resistance has always
863 F.3d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Everette, 694 F. App’x
760, 760–61 (11th Cir. 2017).
128
United States v. Everette, No. 16-11147, slip op. at 2 (11th Cir. July 31,
2017).
129
Hardy v. United States, No. 17-11275, slip op. at 3 (11th Cir. Aug. 11,
2017) (finding summary affirmance appropriate based on Fritts).
130
Stokeling, 684 F. App’x at 876 (Martin, J., concurring).
131
Compare United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Montsdoca v. State, 93 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1922)) (“[S]ince 1922, the
Florida Supreme Court has held that ‘the force that is required to make the offense
of a robbery is such force as is actually sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance.’”), with id. at 1351 (Martin, J., concurring) (“[P]eople convicted under
§ 812.13 after McCloud in 1976 (but before Robinson in 1997) could have had
their convictions sustained under the statute when they merely use ‘any degree of
force.’”).
132
Id. at 1340–41; id. at 1350 (Martin, J., concurring); see Stokeling, 684 F.
App’x at 875 (Martin, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d
1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 2011)) (“[T]he Lockley court correctly identified ‘putting
in fear’—and not sudden snatching—as the least culpable conduct in its categorical analysis of Mr. Lockley’s 2001 attempted robbery conviction.”).
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been the standard, committing a robbery by “force” is still the least
culpable act under the robbery statute because using such force does
not categorically require the use of “a substantial degree of force.”133
Therefore, a Florida conviction for robbery never qualifies as a “violent felony.”134
Under Robinson, a robbery occurs when a victim resists and the
defendant uses enough force to overcome that resistance.135 Thus, if
a victim’s resistance is minimal, the force needed to overcome that
resistance is also minimal. Indeed, Florida caselaw is clear that a
defendant may be convicted of robbery even if he uses only a minimal amount of force.136 A conviction may be imposed if a defendant:
(1) bumps someone from behind;137 (2) engages in a tug-of-war over

133

Recently, one Eleventh Circuit judge also concluded that overcoming resistance does not require the use of “physical force.” United States v. Lee, 886
F.3d 1161, 1169–71 (Jordan, J., concurring).
134
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012); Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).
The Florida robbery statute is indivisible regarding whether a taking was accomplished “by force, violence, assault or putting in fear” because these alternatives
are simply different means by which a single element may be satisfied. See Mathis
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249, 2256–57 (2016). A jury is not “required”
to find one of several alternative options beyond a reasonable doubt. United States
v. Lockett, 810 F.3d 1262, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2016). Therefore, it must be presumed that all robbery convictions are based on the least culpable conduct required under the statute. See Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1340–41 (citing Lockley, 632
F.3d at 1244–45); United States v. Braun, 801 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015)
(citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013)) (“We must presume
that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized . . . .”). And as explained here, that is a robbery “by force.”
135
Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997) (“[I]n order for the
snatching of property from another to amount to robbery, the perpetrator must
employ more than the force necessary to remove the property from the person.
Rather, there must be resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical
force of the offender.”).
136
Id.
137
Hayes v. State, 780 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
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a purse;138 (3) pushes someone;139 (4) shakes someone;140 (5) struggles to escape someone’s grasp;141 (6) peels back someone’s fingers;142 or (7) pulls a scab off someone’s finger.143 Indeed, under
Florida law, a robbery conviction may be upheld based on “ever so
little” force.144
The Ninth Circuit recently recognized this when it held that a
Florida conviction for robbery, regardless of whether it is armed or
unarmed, fails to satisfy the elements clause.145 In so holding, the
Ninth Circuit relied on Florida caselaw clarifying that an individual

138

Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Rumph v. State, 544 So. 2d 1150, 1151–52 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
140
Montsdoca v. State, 93 So. 157, 159–160 (Fla. 1922).
141
Colby v. State, 35 So. 189, 190 (Fla. 1903). In Colby, the defendant was
caught during an attempted pickpocketing. Id. The victim grabbed the defendant’s
arm, and the defendant struggled to escape. Id. Under the robbery statute in effect
at the time, the Florida Supreme Court held it was not a robbery because the force
was used to escape, rather than secure the money. Id. However, the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that this conduct would have qualified as a robbery
under the current robbery statute. See Robinson, 692 So. 2d at 887 n.10 (“Although the crime in Colby was held to be larceny, it would be robbery under the
current version of the robbery statute because the perpetrator used force to escape
the victim’s grasp.”). Indeed, Florida courts have made clear that if a pickpocket
“jostles the owner, or if the owner, catching the pickpocket in the act, struggles
unsuccessfully to keep possession,” a robbery has been committed. Rigell v. State,
782 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN
W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 781 (2d ed. 1986)); Fine v. State, 758 So. 2d 1246,
1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra, at 781).
142
Sanders v. State, 769 So. 2d 506, 507–08 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
143
Johnson v. State, 612 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
144
Santiago v. State, 497 So. 2d 975, 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In Santiago,
the defendant reached into a car and pulled two gold necklaces from around the
victim’s neck, causing a few scratch marks and some redness around her neck. Id.
145
United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2017). The Geozos
Court correctly stated that whether a robbery was armed or unarmed made no
difference because an individual may be convicted of armed robbery for “merely
carrying a firearm” during the robbery, even if the firearm is not displayed and
the victim is unaware of its presence. Id. at 897–901; see State v. Baker, 452 So.
2d 927, 929 (Fla. 1984); State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 413 (Fla. 2004); Williams
v. State, 560 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 977, 980–81 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a Massachusetts
conviction for armed robbery, which requires only the possession of a firearm
(without using or even displaying it), does not qualify as a “violent felony” under
the ACCA’s elements clause).
139
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may violate Florida’s robbery statute without using violent force.146
Although the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have both recognized that
the Florida robbery statute requires an individual use enough force
to overcome a victim’s resistance, the Ninth Circuit stated that it
believed the Eleventh Circuit “overlooked the fact that, if resistance
itself is minimal, then the force used to overcome that resistance is
not necessarily violent force.”147
The issue of whether force sufficient to overcome resistance categorically requires the use of violent force is not unique to Florida’s
robbery statute. It affects robbery statutes throughout the nation. In
fact, most states permit robbery convictions where the degree of
force used is sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance. Indeed, at
least fifteen states use some variation of this standard in the text of
their statutes,148 and several others have adopted it through
caselaw.149 Since Johnson II, several circuits have had to reevaluate
whether these statutes and others still qualify as “violent felon[ies]”
under the ACCA’s elements clause.150 And these courts have
146

Geozos, 870 F.3d at 900–01 (citing Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d
320, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)).
147
Id. Indeed, in both Fritts and Seabrooks, the Eleventh Circuit failed to consult any Florida caselaw about the amount of force required to satisfy the overcoming resistance standard. See United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 942–44
(11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1344 (11th Cir.
2016).
148
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1901, 1902 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a133(1) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 609.24 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.395(1)(a)
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 943.32(1)(a) (2017); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.510(a)(1)
(2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 831(a)(1) (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708841(1)(a) (2016); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 570.010(13), 570.025(1) (2016); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.56.190 (2016); ALA. CODE § 13A-8-43(a)(1) (2015); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.380(1)(b) (2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 791, 792, 793 (2011);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.00(1) (McKinney 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 651(1)(B)(1) (2006).
149
See, e.g., West v. State, 539 A.2d 231, 234 (Md. 1988); State v. Blunt, 193
N.W.2d 434, 435 (Neb. 1972); State v. Sein, 590 A.2d 665, 668 (N.J. 1991); State
v. Curley, 939 P.2d 1103, 1105 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Robertson, 740
A.2d 330, 334 (R.I. 1999); State v. Stecker, 108 N.W.2d 47, 50 (S.D. 1961); Lane
v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Winn v. Commonwealth,
462 S.E.2d 911, 913 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
150
See United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc);
United States v. Walton, 881 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Welch, 884 F.3d
1319 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Jones, 877 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260, 1262 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v.
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reached differing conclusions. As a result, significant tension has
arisen about the degree of force a state robbery statute must require
to satisfy the elements clause.151 The Fourth Circuit’s decisions in
United States v. Gardner and United States v. Winston are instructive in this regard.152
In Winston, the Fourth Circuit held that a Virginia conviction for
common law robbery committed by “violence” does not categorically require the use of “physical force.”153 Such a robbery is committed when a defendant employs “anything which calls out resistance.”154 A conviction may be imposed even if a defendant does
not “actual[ly] harm” the victim.155 Rejecting the government’s argument that overcoming resistance satisfies the elements clause. the
Fourth Circuit held that the minimal force required under Virginia
law does not rise to the level of violent “physical force.”156
In Gardner, the Fourth Circuit held that a North Carolina conviction for common law robbery does not qualify as a “violent felony” under the elements clause because it does not categorically require the use of “physical force.”157 A North Carolina common law
robbery may be committed by force so long as the force “is sufficient to compel a victim to part with his property.”158 “This definition,” the Fourth Circuit stated, “suggests that even de minimis con-

Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 308, 308 n.2 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Duncan, 833
F.3d 751, 753–55 (7th Cir. 2016); Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1338; United States v.
Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 801–02 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d
633, 640 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 977–78 (9th Cir.
2016); United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193, 1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 683 (6th Cir. 2015).
151
See Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (defining “physical force” as “violent force . . . force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”).
152
See Gardner, 823 F.3d at 804 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Winston,
850 F.3d 677, 683–84 (4th Cir. 2017).
153
Winston, 850 F.3d at 683–86.
154
Id. at 684–85 (quoting Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 183 S.E. 452, 454 (Va.
1936)).
155
Id. at 685 (quoting Henderson v. Commonwealth, No. 3017-99-1, 2000
WL 1808487, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2000)).
156
Id. at 683–86.
157
Gardner, 823 F.3d at 803–04.
158
Id. at 803 (quoting State v. Sawyer, 29 S.E.2d 34, 37 (N.C. 1944)).
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tact can constitute the ‘violence’ necessary for a common law robbery conviction under North Carolina law.”159 The Fourth Circuit
then discussed two North Carolina state cases that supported its conclusion.160 Based on these decisions, the Fourth Circuit held that
“the minimum conduct necessary to sustain a conviction for North
Carolina common law robbery does not necessarily” require “physical force,” and therefore the offense does not categorically qualify
as a “violent felony” under the elements clause.161
Like the Virginia offense described in Winston and the North
Carolina offense addressed in Gardner, a Florida robbery may be
committed by force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance.162
As the Fourth Circuit recognized, this definition suggests that so
long as a victim’s resistance is slight, a defendant need only use
minimal force to commit a robbery.163 And, as explained above,
Florida caselaw confirms this point.
During the writing of this Article, the issue came to a head in the
Supreme Court. Proving the point that this issue affects many individuals, sixteen different petitions simultaneously sought review of
whether Florida robbery is a “violent felony” under the ACCA.164
The Supreme Court granted one of those petitions — Stokeling v.
159

Id.
Id. at 803–04 (discussing State v. Chance, No. 07-1491, 2008 WL
2415981, at *3–4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) and State v. Eldridge, No. 08-1219, 2009
WL 1525333, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)).
161
Id. at 804.
162
See Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997).
163
Admittedly, the Fourth Circuit relied on Fritts in an unpublished opinion
to hold that a Florida conviction for robbery qualifies as a “violent felony” under
the elements clause. United States v. Orr, 685 F. App’x 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2017).
The decision in Orr, however, was issued before the Ninth Circuit rendered its
decision in Geozos.
164
Stokeling v. United States, No. 17-5554 (U.S. 2018); Conde v. United
States, No. 17-5772 (U.S. 2018); Williams v. United States, 17-6026 (U.S. 2018);
Everette v. United States, No. 17-6054 (U.S. 2018); Jones v. United States, 176140 (U.S. 2018); James v. United States, 17-6271 (U.S. 2018); Middleton v.
United States, No. 17-6276 (U.S. 2018); Reeves v. United States, No. 17-6357
(U.S. 2018); Rivera v. United States, No. 17-6374 (U.S. 2018); Shotwell v. United
States, No. 17-6540 (U.S. 2018); Orr v. United States, No. 17-6577 (U.S. 2018);
Mays v. United States, No. 17-6664 (U.S. 2018); Hardy v. United States, No. 176829 (U.S. 2018); Wright v. United States, No. 17-6887 (U.S. 2018); Baxter v.
United States, 17-6991 (U.S. 2018); Pace v. United States, No. 17-7140 (U.S.
2018).
160
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United States — and is holding the rest pending that decision.165
Stokeling is the first elements clause case the Supreme Court has
taken since Johnson I and provides the Court a much-needed opportunity to reinforce what it said there — that “physical force” requires
“a substantial degree of force.”166 At a minimum, it requires more
than the minimal force needed.167
V.

FLORIDA FELONY BATTERY & THE ELEMENTS CLAUSE

Like the Florida robbery issue, the issue of whether a Florida
conviction for felony battery qualifies as a “violent felony” under
the elements clause has fractured the Eleventh Circuit.168 The statute
has precipitated a tug-of-war over the contours of Johnson I’s “physical force” definition. While one side calls for an exclusive focus on
the defendant’s act, the other side calls for consideration of the result
a defendant’s act has on a victim.169 A Florida felony battery can be
committed through the same “touch” addressed in Johnson I, but
with the additional element that the defendant’s action unintentionally causes a victim great bodily harm.170 Considering the Supreme
Court has held a touch does not require “violent force,” reviewing
the Florida felony battery statute would provide the Court with an
ideal opportunity to end this tug-of-war.
A.
The Florida Felony Battery Statute
Under Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1), a person commits felony battery
if he: “(a) [a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; and (b) [c]auses great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”171 Felony battery was created to fill a gap between simple battery under Fla. Stat.
165

Stokeling v. United States, No. 17-5554, 2018 WL 1568030 (U.S. Apr. 2,

2018).
166

Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).
See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1412 (2014) (“Minor uses
of force may not constitute ‘violence’ in the generic sense.”).
168
See generally United States v. Vail-Bailon (Vail-Bailon II), 868 F.3d 1293
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
169
See id. at 1303,1305.
170
§ 784.041(1), FLA. STAT. (2017); see T.S. v. State, 965 So. 2d 1288, 1290
(Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
171
§ 784.041(1), FLA. STAT. (2017).
167
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§ 784.03(1)(a) and aggravated battery under Fla. Stat.
§ 784.045(1)(a).172 The “touching” elements in simple battery, felony battery, and aggravated battery are identical—“[a]ctually and
intentionally touch[ing] . . . another person against the[ir] will.”173
However, the three differ in their second elements. Simple battery
does not have another element, while both felony battery and aggravated battery require that a victim suffer “great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”174 The difference between the two is that aggravated battery requires that the defendant
intend the injury; felony battery does not.175 Thus, the issue in
United States v. Vail-Bailon and the following cases is whether a
“touch” that unintentionally results in great bodily harm categorically requires the use of “violent force.”176
B.

The Unpublished Decisions—Eugene, Crawford, and Eady
Before Vail-Bailon, the Eleventh Circuit had issued three unpublished decisions addressing whether a Florida conviction for felony battery requires violent “physical force.”177 The first decision
was United States v. Eugene, which was issued in 2011.178 In Eugene, the court was called upon to determine whether felony battery
qualified as a “crime of violence” under the federal sentencing
guidelines.179 After discussing Johnson I and the elements of felony
172

See Jefferies v. State, 849 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
§§ 784.03, 784.041, 784.045, FLA. STAT. (2017).
174
T.S., 965 So. 2d at 1290 (“The definition of felony battery recites the first
prong of the battery definition and adds the element of causing great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”).
175
Id. (“Aggravated battery can thus be seen as . . . felony battery with the
added element of intentionally or knowingly causing the great bodily harm.”).
176
See generally Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
177
Unpublished decisions are not binding. 11TH CIR. R. 36-2.
178
United States v. Eugene, 423 F. App’x 908 (11th Cir. 2011). Mr. Eugene
also appealed the determination that his Florida conviction for robbery qualified
as a “crime of violence,” but because he only preserved the right to appeal the
district court’s determination that his felony battery conviction qualified as a
“crime of violence,” the Eleventh Circuit dismissed that part of his appeal. Id. at
909–10. (“Eugene appeals from his sentence and asks that we determine whether
his prior Florida felony convictions for battery and strong arm robbery are crimes
of violence under the guidelines.”).
179
See id. at 909–11 (citing United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1253
(11th Cir. 2010)) (“Because the definitions of ‘violent felony’ under ACCA and
173
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battery, the Eleventh Circuit stated that all “touching[s]” under the
statute are not only “capable of causing physical pain or injury to
another person,” but must actually do so.180 Based on this alone, the
court held that felony battery categorically requires the use of violent “physical force.”181
The Eleventh Circuit would not address the issue again for three
years, until 2014, when it decided United States v. Crawford.182 In
Crawford, the court was asked to decide whether a felony battery
conviction qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause.183 Giving short shrift to Mr. Crawford’s challenge, the
Eleventh Circuit stated in a single sentence that “[t]his offense qualifies as a violent felony under the Act because it ‘has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
[another] person.’”184 Five months later, in United States v. Eady,
the court conducted another cursory analysis of the issue, again
holding that a Florida conviction for felony battery is a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause.185 The court would not
address the issue again until Vail-Bailon.

‘crime of violence’ under the sentencing guidelines are virtually identical, we consider cases interpreting one as authority in cases interpreting the other.”).
180
Id. at 911 (internal citations omitted).
181
Id.
182
United States v. Crawford, 568 F. App’x 725 (11th Cir. 2014).
183
Id. at 728 (“Crawford argues that his prior conviction in Florida for felony
battery does not qualify as a violent felony . . . .”). Although Crawford challenged
only the district court’s finding about his felony battery conviction, he also had
convictions for “the sale or delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of
a school, the possession of cocaine, manslaughter with a firearm or deadly
weapon, attempted armed robbery, and attempted robbery during a home invasion.” Id.
184
Id.
185
United States v. Eady, 591 F. App’x 711, 719 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[U]nlike
convictions for simple felony battery where no injury is required, convictions under § 784.041 require significant bodily harm, disability, or disfigurement. It is
incorrect to say that a person can ‘actually and intentionally’ hit another person and cause ‘great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement’ without using ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury.’”). The
court held Mr. Eady’s felony battery conviction also qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause. Id. at 719–20.
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C.
The Panel Decision in Vail-Bailon
In September 2016, the issue of whether Florida felony battery
requires violent “physical force” again came before the Eleventh
Circuit in Vail-Bailon.186 This time, however, the panel issued a
published decision, holding that felony battery is not a “crime of
violence” under USSG § 2L1.2’s elements clause.187
Writing for the majority, Judge Rosenbaum cautioned against
“judg[ing] a book by its cover” when determining whether a crime
with a name like “felony battery” qualifies as a “violent” crime.188
Instead, “[h]eeding the Supreme Court’s warning,” the Vail-Bailon
panel “carefully compared the elements of felony battery under
Florida law to the ‘elements clause’ of § 2L1.2’s definition of ‘crime
of violence.’”189 The panel presumed that the defendant violated the
first prong of the statute through a touch.190 “Significantly,” the
panel observed, “the Supreme Court has already held that Florida
battery, when committed by actually and intentionally touching another against his or her will, does not satisfy the ‘elements
clause.’”191 The panel reiterated the Johnson I Court’s observation
that because a touching can be satisfied by any intentional physical
contact, it does not require “violent force.”192 That the felony battery
186

United States v. Vail-Bailon (Vail-Bailon I), 838 F.3d 1091, 1094 (11th
Cir. 2016).
187
Id. at 1098. The Court noted that USSG § 2L1.2’s elements clause “is the
same as the elements clauses of the ACCA and the career-offender guideline.” Id.
at 1094. In determining whether a prior conviction is a “violent felony” under the
ACCA’s elements clause, courts may rely on cases interpreting the elements
clause under the Guidelines and vice versa. See id.; United States v. Chitwood,
676 F.3d 971, 975 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012).
188
Vail-Bailon I, 838 F.3d at 1092–93 (“This case raises the question of
whether the Florida crime of felony battery—a crime that, from its name, may
sound like a crime of violence—actually satisfies the definition of ‘crime of violence’ under § 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines when it is committed by mere
touching.”).
189
Id. at 1093.
190
Id. at 1094. Because the panel found that the felony battery statute is divisible, the modified categorical approach applied. Id. However, because no Shepard documents established the alternative element under which the defendant was
convicted—a touch or strike—the panel assumed he violated the first prong of the
statute by the least culpable act, a touch. Id.
191
Id. at 1095 (discussing Johnson I, 559 U.S 133 (2010)) (emphasis added).
192
Id.
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statute requires the touching to cause great bodily harm did not
change that.193
Conversely, the dissent argued that the resulting injury required
for felony battery necessarily fulfilled Johnson I’s definition of
“physical force” because it meant that the touching used force “capable of” causing physical injury.194 However, the majority criticized the dissent’s reasoning as “unmoor[ing]” Johnson I’s “physical force” definition “from its context.” The majority noted that in
support of that definition, the Johnson I Court cited the Seventh Circuit’s Flores decision,195 which explained that “physical force”
means force “intended to cause bodily injury, or at a minimum likely
to do so.”196

193

Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1100 (Siler, J., dissenting) (“To be found guilty of violating
§ 784.041, the defendant must be more than capable of causing bodily injury since
he must in fact cause ‘great bodily harm.’ . . . If something necessarily results
from the touching, then the logic is that it had to have been capable of that result
from the beginning.”). Judge Siler sits on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and
was sitting on the panel by designation. Id. at 1092 n.*.
195
Id. at 1097 (citing Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Citations to circuit-court opinions such as Flores do not find
their way into Supreme Court opinions by accident. The Supreme Court’s reliance on Flores must mean something. The
dissent’s argument does not account at all for the Supreme
Court’s reliance on Flores, which very clearly puts into context
what the Supreme Court had in mind when it used the phrase
on which the government relies. Ignoring the citation to Flores
would deprive the Supreme Court’s discussion of the meaning
of “physical,” and thus, “violent,” force of its intended connotation—force that is “intended to cause bodily injury, or at a
minimum likely to do so.”
Id.
196
Id. at 1096. The dissent criticized the panel’s heavy reliance on Flores,
arguing that they should solely rely on the “capability” wording in Johnson I.
Instead of focusing on the language in Johnson [I], the majority
pivots to Johnson [I]’s citation to Flores . . . . Why do we need
to speculate about the definition of “physical force” when the
Supreme Court provided one in Johnson [I]? The Supreme
Court was aware of the mens rea language used in Flores and
chose not to use it. Instead, the operative word is “capability”—
that is, the crime must be capable of causing physical injury.
Id. at 1100 (Siler, J., dissenting).
194
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Under the Flores definition, Mr. Vail-Bailon’s felony battery
conviction did not categorically require the use of “physical force,”
because the resulting injury was not a “likely” or “intended” result
of the touch.197 First, “great bodily harm” is not necessarily “likely”
to result from a touch.198 That a touch actually results in “great bodily harm” did not “somehow change[] the character of the mere
touching from an action that is not likely to result in bodily harm to
one that is likely to result in bodily harm.”199 The panel noted that
felony battery could be committed, for instance, by an offender who
taps another person on the shoulder while that person stands near the
top of stairs, causing the person to be startled and fall down the
stairs.200 Thus, the results of a touching do not alter the nature of the
touching.201
Second, the resulting “great bodily harm” did not have to be “intended.”202 That not only excluded the other prong of the Flores definition, but also implicated the Supreme Court’s decision in Leocal
v. Ashcroft, which held that the phrase “use . . . of physical force” in
the elements clause suggests “a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.”203 The Florida offense at issue
in Leocal, driving under the influence (DUI) and causing serious
bodily harm, is like felony battery: “Though both offenders intend
their actions—mere touching and driving—neither intends the accidental or negligent consequences . . . .”204 Synthesizing both Leocal
and Flores, the Vail-Bailon panel found that “when we discuss an
action that normally does not cause bodily injury . . . that element of
a crime can qualify the crime as a ‘crime of violence’ under the ‘elements clause’ only if the offender engages in it with some type of
intent to harm another.”205

197

See Id. at 1096.
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 1095.
201
Id. at 1096.
202
Id. at 1095.
203
Id. at 1097. Leocal was addressing the elements clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a),
which is substantially similar to the ACCA’s elements clause. Leocal v. Ashcroft,
543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004).
204
Vail-Bailon II, 838 F.3d at 1097.
205
Id.
198
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Thus, the majority focused on whether the act of touching required the proper degree of force, while the dissent favored a backward-looking analysis, assuming that a touch causing an injury was
different from a touch that did not.206 At the end of the day, the VailBailon panel found that a touch is a touch—and because the touch
in felony battery is no more “likely” or “intended” to result in injury
than simple battery, Johnson I dictated that felony battery could not
satisfy the elements clause.207 The dispute, however, was far from
over.
D.
The En Banc Decision in Vail-Bailon
The tension in the Eleventh Circuit over the proper elements
clause analysis came to a head when the court reheard Vail-Bailon
en banc.208 In a 6–5 decision, the court held that felony battery categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements
clause.209
Like the dissent in the original panel opinion, the en banc majority shunned the Flores analysis in favor of a pure “capability”
test.210 In the majority’s view, adopting the Flores definition would
disregard the capability standard explicitly articulated in Johnson
I.211 The majority reasoned that “having cited Flores, the Supreme
Court was aware of how the Seventh Circuit had defined physical
force, but the Court deliberately opted for a different definition.”212
Thus, while the panel opinion viewed the Flores analysis as a harmonious clarification of what “capable of causing physical injury”
206

Id. at 1100 (Siler, J., dissenting). Judge Jordan filed a concurring opinion
explaining that the Court’s unpublished decisions about felony battery in Eady,
Eugene, and Crawford “are flawed and do not constitute persuasive authority,”
because none of these cases considered that a touch was the least culpable conduct
under the statute. Id. at 1098–99 (Jordan, J., concurring).
207
Id. at 1098. The majority left for another day the question of whether felony
battery committed through a “strike” satisfies the elements clause. Id. at 1099
(Jordan, J., concurring).
208
See generally Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
209
Id. at 1308.
210
See id. at 1301.
211
Id. (“[I]f the Supreme Court in [] Johnson [I] had intended to adopt a likelihood-based standard found in Flores, it would have simply said so, and not confused the reader by articulating a test that it never intended to be used.”).
212
Id.
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means, the en banc majority viewed Flores as an opposing standard.213
Moreover, the en banc majority rejected the argument that its
decision would swallow Johnson I’s holding that the touch required
for a simple battery is not “capable of” causing physical injury.214
The majority reasoned that “[t]his argument rests on a faulty premise
that every slight touch is always capable of causing pain or injury,”
and distinguished between “a statute requiring nothing more than a
slight touch” and “a statute requiring a touch that is forceful enough
to cause great bodily harm.”215 Furthermore, the en banc majority
was unpersuaded by the same hypotheticals that the panel majority
had found convincing because the factual scenarios proposed in the
hypotheticals had never occurred in Florida caselaw.216 In its view,
the hypotheticals were far-fetched and incorrectly applied the leastculpable-act rule.217 Thus, the en banc majority did not believe that
a touch was a touch. Instead, the resulting injury required by the
felony battery statute necessarily meant that the touch was “capable

213

Id.
Id.
215
Id. (emphasis added).
216
Id. at 1305–06.
To our knowledge, there is likewise no case in which tapping,
tickling, or lotion-applying—or any remotely similar conduct—has been held to constitute a felony battery under Florida
Statute § 784.041. Rather, the real-world examples of Florida
felony battery we are aware of all involve conduct that clearly
required the use of physical force, as defined by [] Johnson
[I] . . . . [T]he type of touching that has resulted in felony battery
convictions is more along the lines of strangling, dragging, and
biting.
Id. at 1306 (citations omitted).
217
Id. There is currently a circuit split on whether the plain language of a statute, without a supporting case, can establish the least culpable act under a statute.
Compare United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 1274–75, 1275 n.23 (10th Cir.
2017), Swaby v. Yates, 847 F.3d 62, 66, 66 n.2 (1st Cir. 2017), Jean-Louis v. U.S.
Attorney Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 481 (3d Cir. 2009), United States v. Lara, 590 F.
App’x 574, 584 (6th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 849,
849 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007), with United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 222
(5th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
214
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of” causing injury.218 In other words, a touch under the felony battery statute is more “forceful” than a touch under the simple battery
statute.219
Judge Wilson’s dissent, by contrast, argued that the touches
were the same, and criticized the majority’s capability analysis as
“announc[ing] that just one sentence in [] Johnson [I] matters.”220 In
the dissent’s view, the majority’s test “turns not on the amount of
force an act involves but rather on the possible consequences of the
act. Degree of force is irrelevant.”221 The dissent favored a simpler
reading of Johnson I that focused on the degree of contact used.
Thus, limited contact like taps, touches, and pinches did not qualify
as force, while kicks, strikes, punches, and similar degrees of contact
did.222 To the dissent, the “capable of” statement, when read in context with the rest of Johnson I’s force analysis, was meant to underscore that “physical force” means “a substantial degree of force”—
not “that all contact that is capable of causing pain or injury is ‘physical force.’”223 Thus, to the dissent, the case was straightforward:
“[f]elony battery can be committed by a mere touching, and [] Johnson [I] told us that a mere touching . . . . is not a crime of violence.”224
218

Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d at 1301. Moreover, because the majority believed
the felony battery touch amounted to “physical force” and the touch is intentional,
they rejected the argument that the statute does not require the “use of” physical
force under Leocal. Id. at 1307.
219
Id. at 1301.
220
Id. at 1309 (Wilson, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenbaum also filed a dissent,
which was, in large part, also joined by Judge Jordan and Judge Martin. Id. at
1314–23 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenbaum’s en banc dissent agrees
with Judge Wilson’s Johnson I interpretation as well, with an additional focus on
the meaning of “use” in the elements clause under cases like Leocal. Id. at 1315–
18. She argues that it is not enough that the felony battery touch be committed
intentionally, but that the causation-of-harm prong also requires a mens rea element. Id. at 1317. However, the Leocal point is less significant where the dispute
comes down to the nature of the touch itself, given that the touch is volitional. Id.
at 1322.
221
Id. at 1309 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
222
Id. at 1310.
223
Id. at 1313.
224
Id. at 1314. Judge Wilson aptly illustrated his position with the following
example:
If, while walking down the street, you tap a jogger on the shoulder and the tap startles him, causing him to trip, hit his head,
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At the end of the day, each side believed its definition of physical force reflected the purest reading of Johnson I. While five judges
believed that the Johnson I Court intended the capability phrase to
underscore the strong degree of force required, six believed that the
Johnson I Court instead meant that an elements clause analysis
should begin and end with capability.225 Consequently, on rehearing
en banc, the Eleventh Circuit changed course and held that felony
battery categorically requires the use of violent “physical force.”226
E.

A Touch that Unintentionally Results in Injury Does Not
Require Violent “Physical Force”
The Eleventh Circuit’s dispute about felony battery reflects a
fundamental disagreement about the proper reading of Johnson I’s
“physical force” definition. Because the felony battery statute comprises a volitional act that, by itself, requires minimal contact coupled with an unintentional but serious physical consequence, it provides the ideal vehicle for the Supreme Court to resolve this disagreement. Both sides agree that under Johnson I, a mere touch, without more, cannot satisfy the elements clause. However, they disagree on whether the consequences that flow from that touch affects
the elements clause analysis.227
In Mr. Vail-Bailon’s case, the Eleventh Circuit provided at least
three possible answers to this question. First, the original panel majority believed that the Supreme Court clarified its capability analysis by citing Flores’ analysis and stated that a mere touch was not
and suffer a concussion, have you committed a violent act?
Most would say no. But if you punch the jogger and the punch
causes him to fall, hit his head, and suffer a concussion, you
have undoubtedly committed a violent act. The difference between a non-violent and violent act, then, is the degree of force
used. Both a tap and a punch are capable of causing great bodily
harm, but a tap involves a limited degree of force while a punch
involves a substantial degree of force. Or, in the words of the
Sentencing Guidelines, a punch involves “physical force.”
Id. at 1308.
225
See generally Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d 1293.
226
Id. at 1307. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit applied Vail-Bailon’s felony
battery holding to the ACCA. United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846, 869 (11th
Cir. 2017).
227
See Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d at 1304, 1308; id. at 1308–09 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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likely to result in injury, even if it actually did.228 Second, the panel
dissent and the en banc majority believed that the Supreme Court
intended its capability language to stand alone and to capture all offenses “capable of” causing physical injury, necessarily including
offenses that result in that injury.229 The best answer, however, lies
in the third option—the en banc dissent authored by Judge Wilson.
Judge Wilson’s dissent argues that the capability analysis, read
in context with the entirety of Johnson I’s emphasis on substantial,
violent force, was meant to underscore the strong degree of force
required by the elements clause.230 He notes that the “capable of”
language derives meaning from [the force] analysis surrounding
it.”231 To illustrate that point, Judge Wilson provides a more natural,
contextualized reading of Johnson I’s “physical force” definition by
adding his own bracketed text around the “capable of” language:
[T]he phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force
[read a substantial degree of force]—that is, force
[read a degree of power] capable of causing physical
pain or injury to another person.232
Any other reading of the “capable of” language would essentially write out the emphasis on violence found throughout Johnson
I.233 Contrary to the view espoused by the en banc majority, an interpretation that “physical force” includes any offense “capable of”
causing physical injury — with no additional context — would, indeed, swallow Johnson I’s holding.234 Under that definition, one
would be hard-pressed to come up with any offense that would not
hold at least a possibility of causing injury or pain.235 And, under
that definition, “a mere touching does constitute ‘physical force’”
228

Vail-Bailon I, 838 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2016). The Flores likelihood
analysis was essentially a heightened version of the capability test, rather than a
pure degree-focused examination of the act of contact.
229
Id. at 1100 (Silver, J., dissenting); Vail-Bailon II, 868 F.3d at 1302.
230
Id. at 1312–13 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
231
Id. at 1313.
232
Id.
233
Id. See generally Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133 (2010).
234
Vail-Bailon II, 868 at 1313.
235
Id. at 1314 (“Many forms of non-violent conduct have the capacity to cause
pain or injury; pinching and tapping, for example, both can at the very least result
in a person suffering pain.”).
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because a touch is theoretically “capable of” causing pain or injury.236 But as Judge Wilson aptly put it, “[a] spitball that happens
to cause great bodily harm is still just a spitball. A mere touching
that happens to cause great bodily harm is still just a mere touching.”237
Thus, it makes little sense that the Supreme Court would create
a test that would dictate the opposite conclusion of its own holding.238 Given that the Supreme Court “took the time to pen a thorough discussion of ‘physical force’ . . . [w]e should take that entire
discussion into account. When we do, it is apparent that the [capability] sentence does not discard degree of force for a capacity
test.”239 Although Johnson I held that a mere touch is not enough
force,240 there is significant disagreement over the proper form that
an elements clause analysis should take: a degree-of-force focus or
a capability-of-causing-injury focus. Although Stokeling will provide guidance on the amount of force required, Florida robbery has
no harm element.241 Therefore, it may not resolve the issue addressed in Vail-Bailon. Given the Supreme Court’s silence on this
issue and the significant need for greater guidance on the elements
clause analysis, the Supreme Court should review the Florida felony
battery issue to clarify whether an offense that requires great bodily

236

Id.
Any unwanted touching could cause pain or injury. A tap on a
pedestrian’s shoulder could distract the pedestrian causing her
to collide with another person and suffer injury. A student’s
spitball could hit its victim in the eye causing injury. A pat on
the back could startle the victim causing her to jerk her body
and suffer pain. A child’s innocent pinching of his friend could
cause the friend to experience a sharp pain.

Id.
237
Id. at 1312. Judge Wilson also rejected the en banc majority’s view that the
hypotheticals involving touches that resulted in great bodily harm were farfetched—one, because the hypotheticals were realistic scenarios in his view, and
two, because the text of the felony battery statute and Florida courts explicitly
defined the act as a touch. Id. at n.4.
238
Id. at 1313.
239
Id. at 1314.
240
Id.; Johnson I, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).
241
§ 812.13(1), FLA. STAT. (2017).
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harm necessarily requires the use of “a substantial degree of
force.”242
VI.

CONCLUSION

To be sure, this is a touchy subject. The social and economic
stakes are high. These issues affect thousands of individuals now
and into the future, consigning them to years of additional imprisonment. The disagreements throughout the circuits show there are
no easy answers. Indeed, this tug-of-war has forced the Supreme
Court to step in. Certainly, violent individuals deserve stiff sentences. However, the desire to see violent individuals punished does
not give courts license to disregard the Supreme Court’s directives
about the application of the elements clause. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will use Stokeling as an opportunity to illuminate what
it meant in Johnson I — that “physical force” requires a substantial
degree of force.

242

Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140 (2010).

